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12 December 1958

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN




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Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200690001-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25X1 12 December 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Berlin: On the eve of the NATO ministerial meetings in Paris to discuss the Berlin question, Moscow, in a TASS statement on 11 December, hinted that the USSR now is interested in a summit meeting on broader subjects, but not German reunification unless the two Germanies participate. The statement also implied again 25X that if the Western powers continue to be negative toward the proposal for a free Berlin the USSR might at any time turn over all controls of access to the East Germans. (Page 1) USSR--surprise attack talks: Soviet delegate Kuznetsov in a private conversation with US delegate Foster stated that he is pre-25X1 pared for adjournment of the Geneva talks on 17 or 18 December since Moscow believes further discussions at this time would not be helpful. He suggested that the final communiqué should be "objective." with neither side blaming the other. **25**00 1

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Cyprus: As a result of talks between the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey at the United Nations—the first time the major disputants have met privately—the two countries have tentatively agreed to hold secret discussions aimed at resolving differences over Cyprus.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004200090001-25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

New Soviet Statement on Berlin

The Kremlin, in a TASS statement of 11 December, attempted again to sow confusion in Western ranks and divide the Allies on the eve of the Paris NATO meeting on the Berlin problem by stating that the USSR "supports the idea of a meeting between heads of states ... on outstanding international problems.... Specifically excluding German reunification as a topic for such a meeting unless the two Germanies participated, TASS flailed the West for its procrastination in presenting constructive proposals or accepting Soviet suggestions for settling the Berlin problem. The statement repeated most of the assertions of the 27 November proposals and again threatened the West with the full might of the Warsaw Pact armies if attempts are made to assert access rights with force. It implied that access control and other rights in Berlin will be transferred to the East Germans, possibly before the end of the six months grace period, unless the West responded favorably to Soviet proposals.

The statement follows an intensive period of efforts to exploit what the Kremlin sees as Western differences on Berlin by a variety of planted reports, some designed to undermine confidence in the United States. Some of these reports have taken the form of allegations that secret US-Soviet negotiations for a summit conference have been in progress for some time. They link the six-month period with alleged concessions made in Secretary Dulles' press conference of 26 November.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Relations Between Iran and Iraq Deteriorating

Tehran's apprehension and nervousness regarding Iraq's basically unfriendly attitude is growing rapidly, and some Iranian extremists favor intervention, probably by subversive means. Goaded by hostile broadcasts from the Arabs and the Soviet bloc, and excited by the local press, the Iranian public and officials believe that Iraq is rapidly going Communist and is receiving substantial quantities of arms from the USSR.

Relations between the two countries, strained since the Iraqi coup last July, have steadily worsened. Tehran fears that Baghdad is fostering nationalist aspirations among Iran's approximately 500,000 Kurds and its 200,000 Arabs living near the Iranian-Iraqi border. Tehran has protested a number of Iraqi policies and the growing anti-Iranian propaganda in Iraqi publications. The subject of ownership and navigation of the Shatt-al-Arab River, which forms the border between the two countries near the Persian Gulf, has also become a major source of irritation.

Since the delivery of Soviet arms to Iraq, the Iranian Government has come to fear eventual overt aggression from Iraq, and has reiterated its demands for greatly increased US military aid. While Tehran is probably genuinely concerned regarding the dangers to its borders, it may be emphasizing them to American officials just now--while it is involved in its annual budget-making process--in an effort to obtain assistance in making up its deficits.

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
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